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Abstract:  
This paper traces the history and current state of international economic 
development through its institutions and attempts to reassess these 
institutions and their processes in a heterodox manner.  There are many 
stereotypes and clichés to the foreign assistance industry: that it takes from 
the poor in rich countries and gives to the rich in poor countries; that it 
provides laboratories for economists and other social scientists to apply 
theories abroad that they would never attempt at home (the most obvious 
examples of these are population control programs and the privatization of 
pension funds); and that development creates “brain drain” from indigenous 
2institutions to the very institutions of development itself.  Although a brief 
summary of the major research programs in development is given, the paper 
does not attempt to falsify or confirm any of these or other research 
programs and their corresponding policy recommendations.  The purpose of 
the paper is to question the very nature of international economic 
development itself through an historical and philosophical re-examination of 
its institutional constructs.  The Hegelian dialectical method of analysis is 
applied to the institutions of economic development and is used to ask,
“what next and why?”
3Questioning Development Orthodoxy 
“The school of historical thinking indeed provides the very best method to 
arrive at the proper understanding of social, economic, and political 
processes.”
Gustav von Schmoller1
I. Introduction
This paper traces the history and current state of international economic 
development through its institutions and institutional relationships and 
attempts to reassess these institutions and their processes in a heterodox2
manner.  There are many stereotypes and clichés to development: that it 
takes from the poor in rich countries and gives to the rich in poor countries;
that it provides laboratories for economists and other social scientists to 
apply theories abroad that they would never attempt at home (the most 
obvious examples of these are population control programs and the 
privatization of pension programs); and, that development creates “brain 
4drain” from indigenous institutions to the very institutions of development 
itself.  
There has been a plethora of economic research in development (an industry 
which is, after all, dominated by economists.) The Austrian School argues
that development is central planning3 and therefore, due to the economic 
calculation problem4 , laissez-faire should be the route toward development, 
whereas the Public Choice School argues that the government and quasi-
government agencies of development act as rational actors, maximizing the 
best interests of the agencies - and the people who make up the agencies -
and not the best interests of the intended recipients of development 
programs.5 Concurrently it has been argued that orthodox market 
liberalization under the aegis of international development institutions has 
increased inequality in the host countries,6 and that the Washington 
Consensus is hypocritical because the rich countries developed through 
infant industry programs and other protectionist policies which are counter 
to that called for under orthodox development strategies.7
On the other hand, many if not most, developing countries were created out 
of - or exist in - a post-colonialist or war-devastated environment, and 
5wealth-transfers may be moral imperatives. It has been argued that economic 
development programs have increased growth in developing countries by 
funding public goods that host governments might not be able to,8 and that 
development assistance needs to be increased, with policy conditionality 
removed in order to have more steady and assured sources of funding for 
recipient governments. 9
This paper does not attempt to falsify or confirm any of these or other
research questions and programs surrounding international economic 
development.10  The purpose of this paper is to question the very nature of 
development itself through a philosophical re-examination of its 
institutional, historical and philosophical constructs.
  
II.   The Institutions of Development
If you mark the beginning of economics as a scientific discipline with the 
publication of the Wealth of Nations as many (but of course not all of us) do,
then the theory of international economic development can be said to also 
have begun in 1776, because what is The Wealth of Nations, after all, but a 
6study into what makes some countries thrive and other countries stagnate or 
decline.11 However from an institutional perspective, development can be 
said to have started with the founding of the set of institutions devoted 
specifically to the development of “poor”12 countries. 
The Bretton Woods Agreements in 1944 created the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (now the World Trade Organization).13 In addition the governments 
of “rich” countries created bilateral foreign assistance agencies after what 
was seen as the success of the Marshall Plan (1947–1953) to assist in the 
reconstruction of Europe after World War II and, perhaps also as attempt to 
prevent Europe from aligning with Josef Stalin and the Soviet Union. Under 
the Marshall Plan, sixteen countries expended the equivalent of US$130 
billion14 over four years. 
Table One shows a brief outline history of the largest bilateral development 
programs.
Table One
Donor Country Government Development Agency
7United States of 
America
Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA) created 1948 to coordinate 
Marshall Plan; current United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) established with the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961.
France Ministry of Cooperation established in 1961; French aid was divided 
into two parts until 1998, one section for those countries which were 
once part of the French empire and another for those that were not.
Japan Japan foreign assistance programs began in 1954, including payments 
for war reparations; first Japanese aid agency established 1962.  
Germany German foreign assistance became part of government budget in 
1955, coordinated by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BTZ). Current primary German aid agency is the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
founded 1975.  
United Kingdom U.K. established Department of Technical Co-operation in 1961; 
current Department for International Development (DFID) created 
1997.
It could be said that formal institutionalization of bilateral aid began in 1960 
with the creation of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which 
has established agreed-upon guidelines for peer-review and classifying 
development assistance by donor nations.
8In 2005 (for 2003 activity) the DAC reported 22 donor nations giving a total 
of $54 billion to 103 recipient nations.15 These donor funds took form in
bilateral grants and bilateral concessional loans.  In addition multilateral 
development institutions received $19 billion from donor nations. The 
multilateral institutions include the World Bank itself and the regional 
development banks; the African Development Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the 
Latin American Development Bank. Donor nations thus disbursed a total of 
$73 billion in 2003 for development.  
Table Two shows the largest donors and their recipients for 2003 activity.
Table Two
Donor Country Percent of Total Aid Largest Recipients
United States of 
America
30% ($16 billion US 
bilateral development 
assistance divided by 
$54 billion in total 
bilateral development 
assistance.)
Iraq (10% of US aid or $1.5 billion; note 
OECD definition of aid excludes military 
assistance.) 
Democratic Republic of Congo (9%)
Jordan (6%)
Colombia (4%) 
Russia (4%)
France 12% Democratic Republic of Congo (19%) 
Cameroon (4%)
Serbia and Montenegro (3%)
Morocco (3%)
Poland (3%)
9.
Japan 11% Indonesia (19%)
People’s Republic of China (13%)
The Philippines (9%)
Vietnam (8%) 
India (5%)
  
Germany 10% Democratic Republic of Congo (12%)
Cameroon (8%)
Zambia (5%)
People’s Republic of China (3%)
Nicaragua (3%)
United Kingdom 9% India (7%)
Tanzania (6%)
Bangladesh (5%)
Sweden, Norway, Belgium and Canada round out the Top Ten Donors for 
2003.  The Top Ten Recipients are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, 
Vietnam, Indonesia, Tanzania, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, China 
and Serbia and Montenegro.
The World Bank signs 20-30,000 contracts with a total value of about $20 
billion each year. About 10,000 of these contracts (particularly large-value 
contracts) are reviewed by The World Bank staff prior to the contract 
award.16 USAID lists 532 Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs, e.g. not-
for-profit organizations) registered to do business with the agency, has 160 
“partnerships” with more than 200 U.S. colleges and universities from 40 
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states, and in the most recent reporting period let 4633 contracts, grants, and 
cooperative agreements for the year.17
We would also like to include the International Monetary Fund in our 
institutional analysis even though IMF programs are available to both “poor”
and “rich” countries -  it is only when IMF loans are given under 
concessional (below market) terms are the loans considered Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). The main reason for including the IMF, is 
that the IMF, along with the World Bank, might be considered the two prime 
policy-making bodies of the development industry. In order for Bank lending 
agreements to be enacted, a recipient country must first have a signed 
agreement with the IMF. The IMF and the World Bank then coordinate the 
development “plan” within each recipient country, around which bilateral 
donors and other development banks coordinate their activities.  World 
Bank, IMF and regional bank lending are the largest sources of donor 
capital, as opposed to non-financial technical assistance, which more often 
than not is what is contributed by the donor countries through bilateral 
grants.18
11
This set of institutions – the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
the regional development banks, the government agencies of both donor and 
recipient nations, and the contractors, grantees and research institutions and 
individuals who implement and evaluate the aid programs and development 
lending can be labeled as the “development industry.”  It is this industry 
which is the main focus of analysis in this paper.  
III.  Institutional Analysis
In 2005 (for 2003 activity) the World Bank lists 61 countries as low income,
56 countries as lower middle income, 38 as upper middle income, and 54 as 
high income.19 You will note that there were 103 recipient countries in 2003, 
this means that a large minority (41%) of these recipients were classified by 
the WB as at least lower middle income countries.20 A cursory glance at the 
Top Ten Donor and Top Ten Recipient lists show that development is not 
just an economic phenomenon in the neo-classical economics sense where
donors try to maximize economic growth with limited aid dollar in recipient 
countries. (This would of course imply all aid money going to the poorest 
countries, or more specifically, the poorest countries which could show 
growth). A reading of the Top Ten lists above show that rich countries also 
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give aid to poor ones (and not so poor ones) for political purposes – to their 
ex-colonies, for nation-building, for regional stability, to buy political favor 
for potential commercial contacts in countries with statist economies, and, 
perhaps, to influence military-security cooperation and materiel contracts.
The present authors propose that as social scientists it is time to question the 
very nature of development: we need to question the development orthodoxy.  
Our proposal is simple. We believe and hope to prove below that 
development has become a self-fulfilling prophesy; by labeling countries as 
rich and poor we have perpetuated nation-state classes of rich and poor.  By 
allowing the orthodox divide of rich and poor to permeate our social 
consciousness, our economic methodology, and our long-standing, well-
established, development institutions we have created a self-perpetuating 
dichotomy of rich and poor, of North and South. Very few countries, in 
Africa particularly, have “graduated” from the development industry. We 
have created the development industry, we have not created development.
It is only by questioning the orthodoxy of development that we as a global 
system will become equals and not separated by a politically-enabled 
13
institutional divide.  If we face the motionless dialectic that development has 
become – between promises and failures, between nation-state class systems 
of rich and poor - and agree that it is not development we seek, but political 
influence amongst nation-states, at least we are being honest.  From there we 
can address “what next and why?”, but we cannot address that question from 
here.
As stated earlier the donor nations do not necessarily give funds for the 
economic development of the recipient nations, but to buy the political 
influence of these nations.  It has become the norm to continue these 
donations as long as the political alliance continues, but to stop only once 
the political alliance has been fractured. 21  These political relationships, and 
the development institutions themselves, have created a neo-imperialist 
international society, one imposed by financial transfers, not one imposed by 
armies.  It is only by deconstructing these institutions that we can move on 
to the next stage of human development, beyond self-perpetuating nation-
state classifications of donor and recipient, rich and poor.
It is no accident that we list the Top Ten Donors and the Top Ten Recipients
in the same way that a football league lists its winning teams.  Thorstein 
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Veblen wrote of the tendency for nation-states to devolve into 
sportsmanship-like conduct, with patriotism being a substitute for skill and 
workmanship.
The patriotic spirit is a spirit of emulation, evidently, at the same time 
that it is emulation shot through with a sense of solidarity.  It belongs 
under the general caption of sportsmanship, rather than workmanship.  
Now, any enterprise in sportsmanship is bent on an invidious success, 
which must involve as its major purpose the defeat and humiliation of 
some competitor, whatever else may be composed its aim…; and the 
emulative spirit that comes under the head of patriotism commonly, if 
not invariably, seeks this differential advantage by injury of the rival 
rather than by an increase of home-bred well-being. 22
Our donor and our recipients have become like these sports teams, dressed in 
the uniforms of the institutions of international economic development, 
especially the World Bank, the IMF and the bilateral development programs.  
The institutions, and the people within these institutions, have become 
‘captured’ by the constructs created at Bretton Woods and which developed 
and solidified during the Cold War.  These institutions have outlived their 
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time and place, in fact, have now become a hindrance to the economic well-
being and self-possessed23 will of the peoples the aid programs are intended 
to help.  The development industry offers only “the defeat and humiliation” 
of the world’s poor by continuing to label them as the world’s poor.  In 
addition, as is discussed later, the nation-state construct of the development 
industry is a “fetter” (Karl Marx’s term for power inequities thwarting 
progress) holding back development of the world’s people.
Development and the nation-state
Instead of economic development the industry has become, and in fact it 
could be argued was founded on, political development subject to the mores
of the budgetary process.24  Aaron Wildavsky states that, “being a good 
politician…requires essentially three things: cultivation of an active 
clientele, the development of confidence among other government officials, 
and skill in following strategies that exploit one’s opportunities to the 
maximum.”25 Wildavsky goes on to describe the ‘clientele’ process as one 
of 1) Find a clientele, 2) Serve your clientele, 3) Concentrate on individual 
constituencies, and 4) Secure feedback.  This describes the development 
industry, where the institutions of the development industry are each others’
16
clientele, and the feedback they receive are increased budgets.  The 
bureaucracies of the host and donor country foreign ministries, the budget 
officials in the donor-governments and their partners at the aid agencies, the 
development bank officials and their oversight officials at the donor-nation 
finance ministries; these are both the clientele and the constituency.  The
bureaucracies of development work together in a self-perpetuating, self-
evaluating, feedback mechanism within the given constraints of the 
development dialectic.  Under the political process to win at the 
development ‘game’ is not to develop but to receive more funds during the 
next budget process.  
Development is the politics of nation-states.  Donors and recipients by 
definition are defined on a contractual basis in agreements between nations.  
Where is Veblen’s “common man”26 in this construct of development?  Does 
development seek to improve the welfare of people or to create and 
perpetuate status-quo political ties amongst nations?  According to Wesley 
Clair Mitchell when writing about Veblen’s methodology, “As individuals 
we find our places either in the ‘kept classes’ or among ‘the underlying 
population’ – and either ranking makes us wince.”27   The development 
industry and the host country general population serve here as proxies for 
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Veblen and Mitchell’s notion of the relationship between the common man 
and the government elite.  The development elite, whether knowingly or 
unknowingly, consciously or unconsciously, perpetuates Veblen’s ranking, 
dividing peoples.
A “Development” Thought Experiment
Here let us try one of one of Joan Robinson’s “thought experiments”
(Gedanken - experiments).28  The next time you read about rich and poor 
nations, would not the article say the same thing, or in fact more, without 
the generalities and artificial classifications?  The journalism of rich versus 
poor itself has become an institution, no different than the institutions of 
international economic development.  For example in an Economist
article, “Banks in developing countries: branching out”, states, “The 
days when American and European banks were the only foreign options in
developing countries are long gone, as a growing number of banks in such 
places are owned by banks from other developing countries.”29  The article 
then describes the increased cross investment which is occurring worldwide 
under the WTO and other globalization efforts, “This is the natural
development coming from increased trade and economic relations between 
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southern countries….and is growing faster than North-South trade.”  
What is this article really saying?  It is saying that despite the North-South 
divide, economic growth continues.  The next step, the missing step, in our
thought experiment is, what would that growth and development be without
the divide in our collective consciousness?
  
Maybe this articulation points us in a new direction; “fast-growing” or “not 
fast-growing” e.g. a country can be growing at 5% per year per person or 
they are not. This may be more true to the language of macroeconomics 
than the - with economic growth worldwide under the rapid globalization of 
the 20th and 21st centuries - increasingly economically anachronistic and
tautological “rich” and “poor”. Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations,
It is not the actual greatness of national wealth, but its continual 
increase, which occasions a rise in the wages of labor.  It is not, 
accordingly, in the richest countries, but in the most thriving, or in 
those which are growing rich the fastest, that the wages of labor are 
the highest.”30
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Maybe it is not the rich who are rich but in fact the poor who are rich 
because the poor have the potential to grow more quickly.  The rich world 
needs the poor world’s growth and population and the poor world needs the 
rich world’s capital and technology, but the point is that a label is just a 
label; to quote Soren Kierkegaard, “once you label me you negate me.”
Classical Political Economy and Institutional Economics
Karl Marx like Adam Smith before him used the concept of society, and 
economies, advancing through stages as an historical process, and then used 
these stages on which to base their analysis.  This analytical method, where 
man is the center of analysis, and economics - or the production of 
“commodities” - is the result of, or follows, this social stadial analysis is the 
method of classical political economy.  In contrast, economics uses the 
production of commodities as its centerpoint, and the social structures of 
man as a given.  
To quote Marx, 
20
Let me point out once and for all that by classical political economy I 
mean all the economists, who since the time of W. Petty, have 
investigated the real internal framework of bourgeoisie relations of 
production as opposed to the vulgar economists who only flounder 
within the apparent framework of those relations, [who] ceaselessly
ruminate on the materials long since provided by scientific political 
economy and seek there plausible explanations of the crudest 
phenomena for the domestic purposes of the bourgeoisie.  Apart from 
this the vulgar economists confine themselves to systematizing in a 
pedantic way, and proclaiming for everlasting truths the banal and 
complacent notions held by the bourgeoisie agents of production 
about their own world, which to them is the best possible one.”31
The methodological approach of the development industry is one of “vulgar” 
economics, where “rich versus poor” is the given set of assumptions and 
within which economic technicalities are applied (that is when they are 
wealth-maximizing techniques as opposed to politically-driven techniques). 
The stadial development approach of classical political economy has been 
cast-aside, or actually taken reductio ad absurdum32, for a methodology of
technical economics, under a world class-system built and sustained since
21
the time of Bretton Woods.
In Smith’s Wealth of Nations stadial development is one where society 
advances through stages from hunter-gatherer tribes to pastoral animal 
husbandry and small scale farming (concurrent with partitioning of land and 
the development of property rights) to an agriculture-feudal stage and then 
on to commercial society with limited government, the stage at which 
Smith’s Society of Perfect Liberty33 manifests itself.  
The commercial stage is one free of “systems of preference and 
constraints,” e.g. free of government interventions which limit human 
wealth-creation and progress made possible through the division of labor.34
Mankind (and resources) are free to move from one trade to another, and
people are free to trade with each other (removed from mercantilist 
protectionist policies and other constraint “systems”) under commercial
society, whereas in previous stages power was uneven due to economic 
classes enforced through violence or fear of violence, e.g. feudal lord versus 
share-cropper.
Smith,
22
Projectors disturb nature in the course of her operations in human 
affairs; and it requires no more than to let her alone, and give her fair 
play in pursuit of her ends that she may establish her own 
designs….[and in one of Smith’s most famous passages] Little else is 
requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the 
lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration 
of justice; all else brought out by the natural course of things.  All 
governments which thwart this natural course, which force things into 
another channel or which endeavor to arrest the progress of society at 
a particular point, are obliged to be oppressive and tyrannical.”35
Using an analysis of this stadial, classical political economy, approach to 
history and wealth creation, we come to the crux of the problem of economic 
development as it stands today.  Those countries which are deemed “poor” 
never had the opportunity to grow organically their own indigenous sets of 
institutions needed for the Society of Perfect Liberty.   The progress of 
history towards liberty was thwarted by imperialism, which only ended in 
the post-World War II era, after which the development industry and its 
external systems were placed upon the poor world from above replacing one 
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set of external systems with another.  Thus emulation of the rich, instead of 
development of the poor, became the institutional construct, not one of 
internal, “home-grown”, progress.  The nation-state, and the foreign 
assistance industry as its surrogate, became Smith’s “projectors” and the 
foreign model for wealth-creation, not the stadial development towards 
commercial society envisioned under classical political economy.  
Institutional Economics teaches us about the organic derivation and 
evolution of local social and economic institutions.  From Gustav von 
Schmoller of the German Historical School of Economics, we learn that,
“human institutions are not the product of rational deliberations but that they
grow unnoticeably out of the national characteristics of a people.”36 Wesley 
Claire Mitchell states that John Commons of the American Institutional 
School of Economics,  
Accorded a supreme attentiveness to the institutions contrived by 
workmen without the aid of mentors from those of high social stations 
[and what is the development industry but a form of international 
diplomacy?] and education – institutions such as trade unions, 
cooperative buying clubs, cooperative workshops and the like.  He
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[Commons] rejoiced in tracing the steps of unlettered statesman 
whereby these movements laid stable foundations under these
organizations by method of trial and error.  And as a student of such 
movements he knew how incompatible such creativeness from below 
was with external domination by employers, messianic intellectuals, 
or government.  To Commons the workingmen were not building 
blocks out of which a jealous deity called “History” was to shape the 
architecture of the new society, but beings with legitimate ambitions 
for higher standard of living and more dignity in their lives”37.
Mitchell then added financial institutions into the method of institutional 
economics, “the important matter to understand about money is the money 
economy – that is, the cultural significance of the highly organized group of
pecuniary institutions, how they have developed since the middle ages, how
they have gained a quasi-independence, and how they have reacted upon the
activity and the minds of their makers.”38  Development banks in particular 
have their own lives, they are less beholden to shareholders and performance 
based on market efficiency and profit than other financial institutions.  
Development banks by definition, and by their charters, have a large 
percentage of their portfolio at below-market rates and therefore are not held 
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towards self-perpetuation and growth through capital reflows based on 
repayment and profit.  They perpetuate themselves through donor-nation
contributions.  
Thorstein Veblen (a co-founder of the New School for Social Research) 
wrote that in fact there may not be a role at all for the nation-state in 
commercial society,
As an industrial unit, the nation-state is out of date…Life and material 
well-being are bound up with the effectual working of the industrial 
system; and the industrial system is of an international character - or it 
should perhaps be said that it is of a cosmopolitan character, under an 
order of things in which the nation has no place or value. 39
The development industry has been forced – not by the point of a gun but 
through the allure of inexpensive financial resources - upon those countries 
which gained independence with the fall of imperialism. These foreign 
institutions may have “crowded-out” the evolution of domestic commercial 
institutions by dominating the social consciousness – and cash flows - of 
those working for the development institutions in-country – where many of 
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the best paying and most prestigious jobs are those with the bilateral 
agencies and international organizations of the development industry, as are 
some of the most sound institutions in poor countries those of the 
development industry. The development industry too by its quasi- and actual 
governmental nature has created a system of preferences and constraints for 
perpetuating its institutions. The international development institutions have 
taken the place of freely evolving local institutions where man’s instincts for 
self-betterment in their communities can take hold and flourish and where
commercial institutions and commerce-enhancing institutions can arise
organically as appropriate.
IV. Hegelian Dialectic, Progress and Economic Development
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in Philosophy of History proposed that 
mankind’s history is a progress towards freedom. In Science of Logic, Hegel 
introduces his now famous dialectical method of analysis; to paraphrase, that 
this march towards freedom is one of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.  In an 
institutional construct, this can mean that institutions are developed during 
an historical (relative) moment in time, they outlive their usefulness, are 
opposed by alternative institutions, which then evolve into a third set of 
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institutions synthesizing the first two set of institutions which then point the 
way towards progress, towards freedom. Institutions form, evolve and/or 
disappear along the paths of history according to whether or not they are just 
and proper.
The imperialism of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries evolved into the post-
imperialism of the 20th and now 21st century, and the creation, continuation
and ever-enlarging powers of the nation-state and international institutions 
of development.  It may now be time for another antithesis, one that will 
move us beyond the artificial constructs of “rich” vs. “poor” nations and one 
that will help people (Veblen’s “common man”), not nation-states,
(Veblen’s “sportsmanlike conduct”) to progress.  The Hegel dialectic of 
development requires a new synthesis at this moment; one that takes up and 
negates and thus incorporates both imperialism and post-imperialism into a 
new configuration that is more reasonable.
The progress of history is one of moving from the finite to the infinite, and 
the next stage may already be before us.  Hegel writes, “The infinity of the 
infinite progress remains burdened with the finite as such, is thereby limited 
and is itself finite…in this alternating determination of the finite and the 
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infinite from one to other and back again, their truth is already implicitly 
present, and what is required is to take-up what is before us.”40  
The classification of “rich” and “poor” which began under Bretton Woods is 
the definition of Hegel’s finite; the international development institutions, 
and the nation-state development agencies which followed, are themselves 
limiting and finite, self-defining and perpetuating a by-definition limiting 
endgame, that of “rich versus poor.”  With the institutions of development 
the endgame is finite as opposed to infinite, which, arguably, is the better 
state of consciousness for the world’s peoples.41  Without the self-fulfilling 
“rich” and “poor” dialectic of development the endgame - and in fact an 
endlessly possible endgame and thus no endgame at all -  can evolve through 
history, is infinite; with state-sponsored “rich” and “poor” classifications and 
the institutions which perpetuate and reinforce this notion, the endgame is 
finite.
We have seen in Schmoller and Commons that the economic institutions 
formed and which belong in history are those of their own making, driven to 
the fore through man’s own ambitions for self-improvement, not from above 
by his ‘betters’.   Marx has written of institutions forming through class 
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struggle and the seeking of and institutionalization of power.  Smith has 
shown that it is a free commercial society which evolved from the one-sided 
power relationships of feudal society, the state at which many “poor” 
countries found themselves at the time of colonialization.  These states, 
especially in Africa, have not had the opportunity to “modernize”, create 
modern institutions, on their own historic trajectories due to the overlay of 
development institutions on their histories.  
It is only when free will is exercised that old institutions are allowed to pass 
into new ones, building upon what has come before.  Inorganic, inflexible,
government institutions may be restrictive, may be “fetters” preventing 
progress, in the dialectical thesis-antithesis-synthesis formation of societal 
institutions. Institutions which are grounded in law – or in international 
treaty - and not subject to the laws of reform through free-association and 
evolution, may not have historically-evolving life-spans.  It may be that only 
their destruction, not their reform, is possible.
Hegel, 
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As has been remarked, a share in government may be obtained by 
every one who has a competent knowledge, experience, and a morally 
regulated will. Those who know ought to govern, not ignorance and 
the presumptuous conceit of “knowing better”….This is the point 
which consciousness has attained, and these are the principal phases 
of that form in which the principle of Freedom has realized itself; - for 
the History of the World is nothing but the development of the idea of 
Freedom.  But Objective Freedom – the laws of real Freedom –
demand the subjugation of the mere contingent Will – for this is in its 
nature formal.  If the Objective is in itself Rational, human insight and 
conviction must correspond with the Reason which it embodies, and 
then we have the other essential element – Subjective Freedom – also 
realized (that is the will of the individual goes along with the 
requirements of reasonable laws; translator’s note)….Philosophy 
concerns itself only with the glory of the Idea mirroring itself in the 
History of the World. Philosophy escapes from the weary strife of 
passions [from sportsmanship] that agitate the surface of society into 
the calm region of contemplation; that which interests it is the 
recognition of the process of development which the Idea has passed 
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through in realizing itself – i.e., the Idea of Freedom, whose reality is 
the consciousness of Freedom and nothing short of it.42”
The progress of freedom is one of consciousness; in this case the need to 
reexamine and replace our vulgar economics and our current commodity-
man relationship for a renewed consciousness of classical political economy. 
The Idea of Freedom asks that we re-examine our historic, nation-state 
proxy institutions as they are with an eye toward replacing them with 
indigenous commercial institutions and internally-empowered political 
processes as they could be.
V. Conclusion
This paper presented the creation, history and current state of the 
international development “community” and its attendant institutions, and 
grouped these together for purpose of analysis as the “development 
industry”.  The paper then attempted to show that the goal of this industry 
may or may not be the actual economic development of “poor” nations 
through development programs funded by the “rich” nations, but that the 
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industry is one of a relationship between nation-states and thus highly 
subject to the vagaries of the budget process and political winds.
The analytical methodology of classical political economy and Old 
Insitutionalists is used to show that the institutions of development have 
created a roadblock to sustainable human development by obstructing stadial 
development over time, especially thwarting the evolution of institutions 
which had the opportunity to manifest themselves in “rich” world 
commercial society through history. Lastly Hegelian philosophy was used 
to show that the march of history toward ever increasing human freedom 
may be held back by internationally-created and nation-state development 
institutions and that only with raised awareness on the part of both rich and 
poor, but especially the development industry itself, will the stalled progress 
towards freedom continue. 
It is not the purpose of this paper, nor is it possible, to present a completed 
set of blueprints for the development of the third world.  This blueprint, as 
has been shown, can only come with historical development and the 
evolution of institutions amongst free peoples.  This paper has attempted to 
show however, that this historical process cannot be obtained under current 
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international development schema.  As economists and social scientists, we 
need to become aware of this point in history and our current burden of the 
Hegelian finite. 
Karl Marx,
The veil is not removed from the countenance of the social life-
process, i.e. the process of material production, until it becomes 
production by freely-associated men, and stands under their conscious 
and planned control.  This, however, requires that society possess a 
material foundation, or a series of material conditions of existence, 
which in their turn are the natural and spontaneous product of a long 
and tormented historical development.43   
Georg Hegel,
In the absolute method the Notion maintains itself in its otherness, the 
universal in its particularization, in judgment and reality; at each stage 
of its further determination it raises the entire mass of its preceding 
content, and by its dialectical advance it not only does not lose 
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anything or leave anything behind, but carries along with it all it has 
gained, and inwardly enriches and consolidates itself.44
The wealth of the world (the wealth of nations) increased ten fold in the 20th
century over the 19th century45 so perhaps the institutions of development 
could be abolished, per Veblen’s concept of the obsolense of outdated 
institutions, without those in the currently poor world undergoing “a long 
and tormented historical development,” per Marx.  Or perhaps a 
metamorphosis of the development institutions is possible, per Hegel, 
however, history since their foundings has not shown this to be possible nor 
expected.  A starting point might be to ask, “what next and why?” Do we 
want or expect the institutions of development, the “rich” versus “poor” 
divide, to continue for another 50 years?  What should we be doing about it 
now, if anything? 
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1 “Schmoller on Roscher,” in Speigel, ed. (1952), p. 368.
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2 Colander, Holt and Rosser, Jr. (2004) describes heterodox economics as that which is 
part in, and part out, of the mainstream. Orthodox economics is primarily neo-classical 
economics and is wholly in the mainstream.  The authors list, but make it clear that 
heterodox economics is not limited to, Austrian, Feminist, Old Institutional, Marxist and 
Post-Keynesian economics.  
3 See for example Coyne and Boettke (2006) for a recent Austrian School critique of 
orthodox economic development. 
4 Economic calculation determines how resources are allocated in a society.  The 
Austrian School describes the difficulty under socialism (state-led government) to make 
economic calculation absent the market price mechanism, which is needed to determine 
how the resources in an economy are most efficiently distributed via the profit motive.
See for example von Mises (1985 [1927]), pp. 70-71.
5 McNutt (2002) states, “The bureaucrat directly determines the supply of government 
output,” p. 149. Note that the recipient does not have a say in the matter.
6 See for example Cornia (1999) on increased in inequality through market-led 
development.
7 See for example Chang (2005) on the Washington Consensus.
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8 See for example Reddy (2006) on aid for public goods and effect on economic growth.
9 See for example Weeks (2006) on the inconsistency of funding for aid in Africa. 
10 It should be clearly noted that the authors do not wish to infer that poverty, class 
systems, exploitation or monopoly capital do not exist, it is the way in which these 
economic issues are addressed under development orthodoxy which is being questioned 
in this paper.  
11 The full title of Adam Smith’s book is An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations. This has been abbreviated to The Wealth of Nations in modern times. 
12 The vernacular for countries giving foreign assistance (aid) is Donor Country and for 
those receiving aid is Recipient Country.  “Rich” and “poor” might be considered to be 
synonymous, though this oversimplifies the income-status of both giver and receiver.  
Popular and politically-correct terms for recipient countries has changed over the last 50 
years – from the “third world”, to “lesser developed countries” (LDCs), to “developing 
countries”, to “emerging” and “modernizing economies”, and back again to “developing 
countries” and the now popular “North” and “South”.
    
13 It should be noted that with the collapse of the gold standard in 1971 the charter for the 
IMF became obsolete.  That the IMF continues to exist, and has developed a new 
mission, provides credence to the Public Choice analysis. 
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14 Constant 2006 dollars.  See http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/57.htm
for more information on the Marshall Plan.
15 All data in this paper taken from The World Bank, 2005 World Development 
Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005) pp. 346 – 360 unless stated differently.  
Figures are rounded to the nearest $US one billion or one million for narrative clarity.  
  
16 Taken from: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/.
17 Contracting information from USAID.gov, the most recent list of contract, grants and 
cooperative agreements on the website is from 2001.
18 Note that the term “grant” in the aid industry may cause some confusion to readers. 
The term is used to describe money given directly, granted, to the host government, 
however, the term is also used to describe aid in the form of technical assistance which is 
usually the donor hiring under a contract or grant advisors (contractors or grantees, 
mostly from the donor nation itself) to manage the donor’s projects. It can also mean the 
purchase of commodities which are then given to public or private institutions in-country.
The types of donor activity can be seen from this listing (data from 2003 activity, e.g., 
contained in World Bank 2005 publications): the US granted $16 billion and had net 
bilateral loans of negative $2 billion (more was paid back from previous bilateral 
sovereign concessional lending than was lent out for the year).  France granted $6 billion 
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and had negative $0.5 billion in loans, Japan granted $4.5 billion and loaned $2 billion, 
and Germany granted $5 billion and had a negative $1 billion in loans. The Top Ten 
Donors gave $60 billion in grants, had net pay-back of $1 billion in development lending 
and gave $19 billion to the WB and the regional development banks.  
The Top Ten Recipients received a total of $8 billion in grants, net negative $50 million 
from the WB, $100 million from the IMF and $375 million from the regional banks in 
concessional borrowing. The Democratic Republic of Congo received $5 billion in 
grants, $148 million WB lending, $75 million IMF lending, and negligible regional 
development bank lending. Iraq with $2 billion in grants, did not have any WB, IMF or 
regional bank lending.  Vietnam had $1 billion in grants, $500 million WB, negative $70 
million IMF, and $180 regional (i.e., Asian Development Bank) lending.  Indonesia 
received $1.5 billion in grants, paid-back the WB almost $1 billion, received $500 
million in non-concessional IMF lending and had negligible net regional bank borrowing.  
Tanzania received $1 billion in grants, $400 million in WB, $20 million IMF, and $50 
million regional (i.e., Africa Development Bank) lending.  
       
19 The World Bank (2005b).
20 Calculation: 103 recipient countries minus 61 low income countries equals 42 countries 
not in the low income category, e.g., 42 recipient countries were classified by the World 
Bank as lower middle income or higher.
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21 See for example Weeks (2006) who proposes that donors provide more stable levels of 
funding year-to-year so that recipient nations can better rationalize this funding in their 
national planning to garner larger impact.
22 Veblen ([1904] 1958), p. 33.  In addition, Dowd (2000) writes that “the instinct of 
sportsmanship, then, or the exploitative instinct, is a predatory inclination, setting man 
against man in a relationship of parasitism.  This must be compared with the constructive 
instincts which are cooperative in their general application.  The state, the military and 
the church are all buttressed by the predatory instincts, with patriotism and religious 
belief acting to preserve the existing order….which, consciously or not combined, to 
extract a toll – in the fashion of medieval robber barons – from the common man,” p. 21.
23 See Locke (2004 [1690]), for the concept of self-possession (free will and the ability to 
exercise this will in a free society) which was followed-upon by Adam Smith in his 
works.
24  Reddy (2006) directly classifies aid given for political purposes and for economic 
development purposes. 
25 Wildavsky (1985 [1964], pp. 64-65. 
26  Dowd (2000) writes that “the instinct of sportsmanship, then, or the exploitative 
instinct, is a predatory inclination, setting man against man in a relationship of parasitism.  
This must be compared with the constructive instincts which are cooperative in their 
general application.  The state, the military and the church are all buttressed by the 
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predatory instincts, with patriotism and religious belief acting to preserve the existing 
order….which, consciously or not combined, to extract a toll – in the fashion of medieval 
robber barons – from the common man,” p. 21.
27 “Mitchell on Veblen,” in Speigel, ed. (1952), p. 386.
28 See for example Robinson (1981).
29 Economist (2006), p. 71.
30 Smith (1994 [1776]), p. 79.   
31 Marx (1979 [1867]), pp. 174-175, footnote 34.
32 It might be argued that the institutions of development have created their own form of a 
static stadial history, one with two perpetuating stages; rich and poor. 
33 See Smith (1976 [1759]) for the Smith’s concept of the Society of Perfect Liberty 
based on the philosophical views of man’s nature as developed during the Scottish 
enlightenment, especially relating to political and social philosophy which Smith then 
used in his methodological approach to Wealth of Nations.
,
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34 It should be noted that Smith was concerned that specialization of labor would limit the 
intelligence of workers, therefore Smith called for public education in his Society of 
Perfect Liberty.
35 Smith (1994 [1776]), p. xliv.
36 “Schmoller on Roscher,” in Speigel, ed. (1952), p. 367.
37 “Mitchell on Veblen,” in Speigel, ed. (1952), p.406.
38 “Mitchell on Veblen,” in Speigel, ed. (1952), p. 421.
39 Veblen (1934), pp. 388-89.  
40 Hegel (1989 [1812]), pp. 142, 143.
41 An infinite consciousness is more equitable than a finite consciousness.  Equality of 
opportunity, one definition of equity, is more open-ended without self-defining limits.
42 Hegel (1956 [1830-1831]), pp. 455-456.
43 Marx (1979 [1867]), p. 173.
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44 Hegel (1989 [1812]), p. 840.
45 DeLong (2006).
